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This paper addresses the impact on investment incentives of the network sharing arrangements
mandated by the Telecommunications Act of 1996, with a focus on the implications of irreversible
investment. Although the goal is to promote competition, the sharing rules now in place reduce
incentives to build new networks or upgrade existing ones. Such investments are irreversible – they
involve sunk costs. The basic framework adopted by regulators allows entrants to utilize such
facilities at prices reflecting what it would cost a new, efficient, large-scale network to be built. Such
sharing opportunities are extensive, covering virtually the entire suite of network services provided,
and extremely flexible, as the entrant can rent facilities in small increments for short duration, with
no long-term contracts required. Because the entrant does not bear the sunk costs, this leads to an
asymmetric allocation of risk and return that is not properly accounted for in the pricing of network
services, which creates a significant investment disincentive. 
Robert S. Pindyck
MIT Sloan School of Management






I.  Introduction 
 
With the goal of increasing competition, the Telecommunications Act of 1996 
(Telecom Act) transferred an important set of property rights from incumbents to 
entrants.  This restructuring allows entrants to use telephone networks according to terms 
and conditions determined by regulators.  Of central importance to this arrangement is 
that network owners must share their capital with rivals at the option of the rivals, who 
are free to utilize facilities when they desire to do so, for services of their choosing.  They 
are under no obligation to financially support network investments.   
 
This operational flexibility is of great value to entrants, and is very costly to 
supply by incumbents.  However, the pricing formula used by regulators to set lease rates 
for capital (i.e., wholesale prices for access to network infrastructure) does not 
compensate incumbents for these rights.  The result is that wholesale network prices are 
set below competitive market levels, so that incumbents are effectively forced to 
subsidize entrants.  At issue is whether this is efficient, in the sense of promoting 
investment and enhancing competition in a way that promotes lower prices and higher 
quality over the long run.  I will argue that this pricing formula is not efficient – that it 
discourages investment by both incumbents and new entrants, and over the long run 
could threaten the breadth and quality of the telecommunications infrastructure in the 
United States. 
 
The Telecom Act opened local telecommunications markets to new rivalry, 
striking down legal entry barriers by pre-empting state-issued franchise monopolies.  This 
succeeded in permitting new competitors to offer services.  An interconnection obligation 
in the Act further guaranteed that these new networks would have an opportunity to 
compete despite the presence of strong network effects.  However, the network sharing 
rules adopted to further entice entry reduce incentives to invest in network creation by 
appropriating upside rewards while leaving network owners fully liable for downside 
losses.  Some have argued that this cross-subsidization increases entrants’ incentives to 
invest.
2  In fact, quite the opposite is most likely. 
 
If promoting entry were costless, it would clearly be desirable to entice more 
competitors into the market.  With the network sharing rules now in place, however, the 
cost of this entry is to reduce incentives to build new networks or upgrade existing ones.  
These sharing rules also distort other incentives of both incumbents and entrants that I 
will not address in this paper.
3  My concern here is with incentives to build infrastructure 
                                                 
2 See, for example, Affidavit of R. Glenn Hubbard, William H. Lehr, and Robert D. Willig on Behalf of 
AT&T Corp., In the Matter of Implementation of the Local Competition Provisions of the 
Telecommunications Act of 1996, CC Docket No. 96-98, Exhibit C. 
 
3 For example, Jerry A. Hausman and J. Gregory Sidak, “A Consumer-Welfare Approach to the Mandatory 
Unbundling of Telecommunications Networks,” The Yale Law Journal, Vol. 109:417 (1999), explain that 
wholesale prices that are artificially low because of regulation make the demand for network sharing more 
inelastic.   Alternatively, Joseph Farrell, “Creating Local Competition,” identifies the tension between 
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in the face of extensive network sharing mandates.  When regulation reallocates rights 
from network owners to other users, it impacts investment incentives to create, expand, or 
modernize telephone networks.  My objective is to clarify these effects. 
 
I focus on the nature of decisions to make irreversible capital investments in 
telecommunications network infrastructure.  Such investments constitute long-term 
commitments to serve a particular market.  A mandate to share this capital with 
competitive entrants raises important questions: (1) Will payments (for sharing) 
compensate for the sunk costs that have been made?  (2) Will the returns made in “good 
times” compensate for the lack of compensation expected to be experienced in “bad 
times.”  A rational network owner must ask such questions when considering whether to 
bear the risks associated with irreversible investment.  While large outlays are required to 
bring new technologies and valuable services to the market, shifting claims to the ensuing 
profits from network builders to others changes economic behavior. 
 
The Telecom Act envisioned a world of independent physical networks 
competing with each other to provide telecommunications services in local markets.   
Unbundling was intended to help facilitate entry so this goal could be reached.  The intent 
was not to have permanent regulation, but rather to transition from regulation to free 
market rivalry.
4  It is important to determine whether the pathway constructed by 
regulators is likely to achieve this, or instead will suppress investment and delay the 
emergence of new technologies and rival systems.  The inherent tension between these 
distinct approaches to competition – creating new networks versus sharing existing 
facilities with independent suppliers – requires that sharing mandates be evaluated in 






                                                                                                                                                 
universal service obligations and retail rate averaging, on the one hand, and wholesale network sharing 
prices that are not similarly averaged, on the other.  Joseph Farrell, “Creating Local Competition,” 49 
Federal Communications Law Journal, November, 1996, (available at: 
http://law.indiana.edu/fclj/pubs/v49/no1/farrell.html).  
 
4 “The Telecommunications Act is not a rate making statute seeking better regulation.  It is a deregulatory 
statute seeking competition… [T]he Act itself says that its objective is to substitute competition for 
regulation.”  Verizon Communications v. FCC, 535 U.S. 467 (2002) (Breyer, concurring in part and 
dissenting in part, pp. 79-80). 
 
5 “Each unbundling of an element imposes costs of its own, spreading the disincentive to invest in 
innovation and creating complex issues of managing shared facilities.  At the same time… a broad 
[network sharing] mandate can facilitate competition by eliminating the need for separate construction of 
facilities where such construction would be wasteful.  Justice Breyer concluded that fulfillment of the Act's 
purposes therefore called for ‘balance’ between these competing concerns.” United States Telecom 
Association v. Federal Communications Commission (D.C. Cir., No. 00-1012; May 24, 2002), p. 13, 
footnotes omitted, http://www.fcc.gov/ogc/documents/opinions/2002/00-1012.doc.  Justice Breyer’s 
analysis referenced in the opinion appears in Iowa Utilities Board, 525 U.S. pp. 428-29 (Breyer, J., 
concurring in part and dissenting in part).   
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A. Background 
 
In the United States, each household or business is able to obtain telephone 
service from one or more suppliers.  The traditional operator, until 1996 typically a 
franchise monopoly, is referred to as an Incumbent Local Exchange Carrier (ILEC).   
These firms face certain obligations to provide service to retail customers. Pursuant to the 
1996 Telecom Act, they also face certain obligations with respect to rival suppliers, 
which are referred to as Competitive Local Exchange Carriers (CLECs).  The Telecom 
Act requires ILECs to make pieces of their networks available to CLECs, a policy 
referred to as “unbundling” the local network.  The Federal Communications 
Commission (FCC) has established several unbundled network elements (UNEs) that a 
competitor can lease individually or collectively.  The Telecom Act envisioned CLECs 
leasing pieces of the local telephone network to complement their own infrastructure 
investments.  For example, a CLEC could install a telephone switch while leasing the 
copper loop connecting that switch to a customer’s premises.  The Act also created a 
retail mechanism that enables a CLEC to resell service delivered over the ILEC’s 
network in neighborhoods where it has yet to construct facilities. 
 
A CLEC and an ILEC might negotiate a price between themselves for the 
CLEC’s use of a UNE.  However, if they are unable to negotiate a price (which, given the 
low regulated prices described below, is usually the case), then the price is determined by 
regulation. The calculation of the regulated prices for the UNEs is guided by a framework 
called Total Element Long Run Incremental Costs, or TELRIC.
6  This approach aims to 
create a rental rate for each network element that would equal the incremental cost of 
creating and supplying that leased element if the network owner were designing and 




Unfortunately, TELRIC pricing is inefficient in the sense that it under-
compensates ILECs for their investments in infrastructure, and thus is likely to 
discourage investment.  There are two important reasons for this. 
 
First, even if there were no uncertainty over future market conditions, TELRIC 
prices would still not allow for the full recovery of the ILEC’s sunk costs.  The reason is 
that the TELRIC price is based on the current cost (or the expected future cost looking 
                                                 
6 I am focusing here on wholesale prices.  Retail prices for incumbents are usually subject to price-cap or 
rate of return regulation.  A few states, such as Massachusetts, have deregulated or allowed increased 
pricing flexibility for the rates that incumbent ILECs can charge retail customers. 
 
7 Two caveats: the design of the optimal network would be constrained by the existing locations of central 
offices (buildings that house significant electronic equipment) and some portion of common costs are 
allocated to the individual rate elements.   “[T]he regulator must look to what it would cost a hypothetical 
perfectly efficient firm to supply that element in the future, assuming that the hypothetical firm were to 
build essentially from scratch a new, perfectly efficient communications network.  The only concession to 
the incumbent’s actual network is the presumption that presently existing wire centers – which hold the 
switching equipment for a local area – will remain in their current locations.”  Verizon v. FCC, 535 U.S. 
467 (2002) (Breyer, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part, p. 3). 
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two to five years out) of telephone network equipment, rather than the cost that was 
actually incurred by the ILEC.  (The use of current or expected future cost is often 
referred to as “forward-looking” cost.)  Many telecom equipment costs, however, tend to 
fall over time as a result of technological improvements and increasing competition 
among suppliers.  As a result, the ILEC will receive a price based on an equipment cost 
that will generally be below the cost it actually incurred.  To take a simple example, 
suppose that two years ago an ILEC bought a switch for $1 million, and this year the 
same switch can be purchased for $800,000.  In this case the TELRIC price for the use of 
the switch will be based on the current $800,000 cost rather than the $1 million actually 
paid, and the ILEC will be unable to recoup the cost of its investment.  Looking forward, 
then, the ILEC knows that even absent risk, a sunk cost investment in new equipment 
will have a negative NPV, and thus should be avoided.
8 
 
The second reason that TELRIC pricing under-compensates ILECs for their 
investments has to do with its treatment of risk.  Future market conditions are (and 
always will be) highly uncertain, so any investment in network infrastructure will yield 
uncertain returns over the lifetime of the investment.  When considering a new 
investment, the network owner sees the opportunity for positive returns in “good times” 
as compensation for assuming potential liability for losses should “bad times” prevail.  
But what about a CLEC that enters the market and considers renting all or part of the 
network infrastructure?  If market conditions are favorable, the CLEC will go ahead and 
lease the equipment, but if conditions are unfavorable, it will not do so.  Thus unlike the 
ILEC that actually made the capital investment, the CLEC does not bear the burden of the 
uncertainty – it benefits on the upside, while avoiding the downside.  The TELRIC price, 
however, does not take this into account.  As a result, under TELRIC pricing, the ILEC is 
subsidizing the CLEC by bearing the entire cost of downside exposure to risk.  Once 
again, this discourages capital investment. 
 
Because of the considerable volatility in telecom markets, this second problem 
with TELRIC pricing is particularly important.  If one wants to understand and properly 
assess TELRIC pricing, it is crucial to understand the full implications of this asymmetric 
treatment of risk.  As explained below, this treatment of risk under TELRIC rules is 
equivalent to omitting a costly input when calculating the level of compensation for 
investors in network infrastructure. 
 
 
B. Network Investments 
 
If network investments were largely reversible or if there were very little 
uncertainty over the future returns from such investments, then TELRIC’s treatment of 
risk would not be very important, and could probably be ignored.  If network investments 
were largely reversible, an ILEC could simply “uninvest” if and when market conditions 
became unfavorable, and would not have to bear the financial consequences of the 
                                                 
8 Of course the TELRIC price is set in state regulatory proceedings and can be influenced by many factors.  
What is relevant to the above example is that investors anticipate that future TELRIC prices are likely to 
incorporate capital costs that are below the prices they actually pay to construct network facilities. 
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unfavorable conditions.  (In practice, this would mean selling off the equipment and 
recovering all or nearly all of the original investment expenditure.)  And, of course, if 
there were very little uncertainty over the future returns from investing, any treatment of 
risk would be moot to begin with.  Note that if either of these conditions held, it would be 
sufficient to allow us to ignore the issue of risk.  The fact is, however, that neither of 
these conditions holds:  Network investments are largely irreversible and there is 
considerable uncertainty over the returns from those investments.   
 
Why are network investments largely irreversible?  For some types of investment, 
recovery through resale is simply not possible.  An example is copper or fiber-optic cable 
that has been placed underground.  Most of the cost of this investment is the cost of 
putting the cable underground, as opposed to the cable itself, so removing the cable (with 
the hope of reselling it elsewhere) would not be economical.  But what about investments 
in switches or other equipment that presumably could be uninstalled and resold to some 
other company?  In this case, the problem is that the equipment is industry-specific, and 
its resale value is tightly connected to economic conditions of the industry.  Thus, if 
conditions turned out to be unfavorable because industry wide conditions were weak, so 
that the firm wished to “uninvest” by removing and reselling the equipment, it would find 
that other firms would also want to resell such equipment, and in all likelihood no firm 
would want to buy the equipment.
9  In other words, the economic value of the equipment 
would move up or down along with the economic conditions of the industry, making the 
investment effectively irreversible.  This point is often ignored or misunderstood.   
Business people, regulators, and even economists will sometimes claim that an 
investment expenditure is not sunk (i.e., is reversible) as long as the capital could be 
resold to another firm.  At issue is whether it could be resold for something close to the 
original price at a time when market conditions are so unfavorable that most firms in the 
industry would also be selling, rather than buying, physical capital. 
 
Why are the returns from network investments highly uncertain?  A variety of 
factors create uncertainty in this industry.  On the demand side, although the population 
(and thus the potential market) tends to grow steadily, the willingness to buy various 
telecom services — particularly those that tend to generate the most revenue — varies 
considerably with general economic conditions or even current fashions.  In addition, 
there is competition from close substitutes for land-based telephone service, most notably 
wireless service but also cable and Internet-based service, and the prices and qualities of 
these substitutes evolve unpredictably.  All of this makes demand volatile and difficult to 
predict.  On the supply side, the very competition induced by regulation — as well as 
competition that would arise even without regulation — generates uncertainty over the 
portion of the customer base that the incumbent will be able to service, and the prices that 
can be charged. 
 
                                                 
9 To the extent that the fortunes of a particular company are not associated with the fortunes of the industry, 
this effect is muted.  This effect will also be muted for equipment that is not industry specific.  For 
example, cars and trucks could probably be resold to companies in other industries (although at prices 
below the original purchase prices). 
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In summary, network investments are largely irreversible and are subject to 
considerable uncertainty.  As will be explained in more detail later, this implies that when 
a local exchange carrier builds its system, it incurs opportunity costs beyond its actual 
capital expenditures.  The reason is that when the firm makes the investment, it gives up 
its option to wait to see how uncertainty about markets, costs, and regulations is resolved.  
Under the FCC’s unbundling rules, incumbents are not compensated for this option value, 





The rest of this paper is organized as follows.  Section II provides an overview of 
the relevant regulations stemming from the Telecom Act, a discussion of the key players 
in local telecommunications markets, an overview of TELRIC pricing, and an example of 
how the regulations impact players’ costs and behavior.  Section III discusses in more 
detail how TELRIC pricing affects the incentives of ILECs and CLECs.  Section IV 
provides an introduction to the concept of option value, how it arises in the context of 
irreversible investments under uncertainty, and its application to investments in 
telecommunications infrastructure.  Section V has a more detailed illustration of TELRIC 
pricing and the disincentives for investment (by both ILECs and CLECs) that it creates.  
Section VI addresses misconceptions about option value and the cost of capital that have 
appeared in the regulatory, judicial, and academic literatures.  Section VII concludes.  
 
 
II. The Regulatory Environment 
 
Before discussing TELRIC pricing and irreversible investment in detail, it will be 
useful to briefly summarize the key players, the relevant regulations stemming from the 
Telecom Act, and the nature of TELRIC pricing itself. 
 
 
A. The Players 
 
The incumbent telephone carriers are designated by their prior role in providing 
telecommunications, typically as franchise monopolies, even as the market evolves past 
this historical structure.  The 1996 Act ended legal barriers to entry.  It also placed 
important mandates on ILECs, which must interconnect with rivals and offer unbundled 
wholesale access as determined by regulators.  While there are hundreds of ILECs, the 
four largest account for nearly 90 percent of total ILEC lines and 93.8% of ILEC plant in 
service.
10  These are the Regional Bell Operating Companies (RBOCs) — BellSouth, 
Qwest, SBC and Verizon.  
                                                 
10 Statistics of Communications Common Carriers, Tables 2.8 and 2.13, available at 
http://www.fcc.gov/Bureaus/Common_Carrier/Reports/FCC-State_Link/SOCC/01socc.pdf and Trends in 
Telephone Service, Table 7.3, available at http://www.fcc.gov/Bureaus/Common_Carrier/Reports/FCC-
State_Link/IAD/trend803.pdf. 
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CLECs, the competitive entrants, serve retail customers through three main 
strategies, used alone or in combination.  One approach is to enter the market as a pure 
reseller.  Originally, this was done under “resale” as required by the Telecommunications 
Act.  CLECs were given discounts of between 15% and 25% when purchasing retail 
services at wholesale.
11  This approach has largely been superceded due to more 
favorable wholesale pricing under UNE-P (for “unbundled network elements – 
platform”).   
 
Under UNE-P, the CLEC purchases the entire set of UNEs already preassembled 
by the ILEC.  The CLEC can then rely on an ILEC to provide network services to retail 
customers, directly supplying only marketing, billing, and some customer service.  Done 
this way, the wholesale discount from retail is typically above 45%.
12   Pure resellers 
include Talk America and Z-TEL.  Over 11 million (of about 200 million) U.S. telephone 
lines are provided by UNE-P, with UNE-P lines growing rapidly in 2002 and 2003.
13  
Just over half of these lines are accounted for by AT&T and MCI, which added local to 
the long distance telephone service that they provided retail customers.
14    
 
A second entry strategy used by CLECs combines a subset of UNEs with the 
CLEC’s own capital infrastructure.  A typical approach would involve a CLEC renting a 
local loop, but connecting it to its own (or another CLEC’s) switch in the central office, 
at which point service is provided separately from the ILEC’s network.
15  An example of 
this type of CLEC is McLeod, which connects its data and voice switches to business 
customers via local ‘last mile’ connections owned by the ILEC.
16 
                                                 
11 John Hodulik, Batya Levi, Robert Hopper and Rise Barron, “How Much Pain from UNE-P?,” UBS 
Warburg Global Equity Research, August 20, 2002, p. 6. 
 
12 Ibid., p. 8. 
 
13 CompTel, “Wholesale Lies: The Truth About RBOC UNE-P Costs,” May 21, 2003. 
 
14 Association for Local Telecommunications Services, “The State of Local Competition 2003,” April 
2003. 
 
15 “It is now generally agreed that the most effective method of entering local markets is to lease lines 
connecting customers to switches and to purchase and install switches.  This is being called the ‘smart 
build’ model.  The lines may be unbundled network loops from an ILEC or lines from another competitor.  
FirstWorld Communications, Inc. started to install fiber in local markets, but then adopted the ‘smart-build’ 
model and ‘the economics look a whole lot better,’ according to Sheldon Oringer, FirstWorld’s president 
and CEO.  ‘It doesn’t take a whole lot of capital,’ he goes on to say, ‘to move forward with a switch-based 
plan.’” Greg Hallman and Chris McClain, “Real Options and Applications for Telecommunications 
Deregulation,” in James Alleman and Eli Noam, eds., The New Investment Theory of Real Options and Its 
Implication for Telecommunications Economics (Boston: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1999, Second 
Printing 2002), 139-57, p. 143.  The market realities have changed substantially since the October 1998 
academic conference at which the above paper was given, and FirstWorld has exited the local exchange 
business.  Michael Singer, “EarthLink and Covad Snap Up FirstWorld's DSL Subscriber Base,” 
Siliconvalley. internet.com (July 27, 2001), 
 http://siliconvalley.internet.com/news/article.php/3531_855781.   
 
16 McLeod USA, Inc. Form 10-K for the Fiscal Year Ending December 31, 2002, p. 3. 
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A third entry strategy is to provide phone service without using ILEC facilities, 
and instead build a competing network infrastructure.  Cox is a traditional cable TV 
operator offering high-speed data services and, in some markets, digital phone service 
over their fiber-coaxial cable systems.  In areas where its telephone service has been 
available for as long as four years, Cox reports 40% penetration (i.e., four in ten 
households that can subscribe do so), an average of 1.4 lines per household, and long 
distance penetration of 75 percent.
17  Overall, about 3.0 million households subscribed to 
cable telephony at year-end 2002.
18  Given the average penetration rate of 19% reported 
by Cox,
19 about 16 million homes can select local telephone service via their cable TV 
operator.  RCN uses similar hybrid networks to deliver video, voice, and high-speed data 
(via cable modem) in competition with both cable and telephone service incumbents.  
The company passes over one million homes, serving about 388,000 video subscribers, 




B. Unbundled Network Elements (UNEs) 
 
In implementing the Telecommunications Act’s mandate that incumbents share 
their networks with new rivals, the FCC divided phone networks into seven basic pieces, 
or “elements.”  Each of these must be made available to CLECs on terms set by 
regulators.  UNEs include such network building blocks as the local loop (circuits 
connecting end users to switches located in central offices), switching (routing phone 
traffic from the ‘last mile’ connection towards its destination), transport (transmission 
facilities between central offices), and Network Interface Devices (the box connecting 
wiring in a customer’s premises with the phone network).   
 
Two facets of the unbundling regime are especially important.  First, the FCC’s 
rules currently permit UNE-P, allowing entrants to simply resell services without 
investing in network infrastructure.  The second is that the use of such elements, either in 
combination or separately, allows the entrant much more discretion over services and 
products it can offer, and when it will offer them.  
 
                                                                                                                                                 
 
17 Merrill Lynch, “Cable Telephony Update,” February 21, 2003, p. 2; Cox Communications, Presentation 
to the Deutsche Banc Alex Brown Ninth Annual Media Conference (June 5, 2001), available on 
www.cox.com/investor.   
 
18 Federal Communications Commission, “Local Telephone Competition: Status as of December 31, 2002,” 
Table 5.   
 
19 Cox Communications, “The Winning Strategy: Positioning Us for Future Growth,” Presentation to the 
Lehman Brothers Conference (May 2003), Slide 5, available on www.cox.com/investor.  
 
20 RCN Corporation Form 10-Q for the Period Ending March 31, 2003, p. 22.   
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C. TELRIC Pricing 
 
Apart from deciding what elements of the network must be unbundled, the most 
important aspect of implementing unbundling is determining the prices at which UNEs 
can be leased – prices that vary by UNE, by area, and over time.  Without regulation of 
these prices, there would be no policy question to resolve: ILECs and CLECs would 
simply negotiate market-based rates.  The motivation for regulation stems from the belief 
that such negotiation would result in prices inefficiently high, as incumbent operators 
resisted competition by demanding access fees that reflected their market power. 
 
Under the 1996 Telecommunications Act, as interpreted by the courts, the FCC 
created a wholesale pricing model which individual state regulatory commissions then 
utilize to set specific UNE rates.  This model is called TELRIC, for total element long-
run incremental cost.  Under TELRIC, each UNE must be rented by an ILEC to any 
CLEC at a price that reflects both the incremental costs of providing that specific 
functionality and some contribution to the common costs of operating a network.  A 
crucial aspect of TELRIC is that these costs are estimated to be those of a hypothetically 
efficient network built at current prices. (In fact, the assumed costs could be even lower 
because regulators look at “the forward-looking cost of currently available equipment.”
21)  
That is, costs are based not on the actual experience of the ILEC, nor on the experience of 
any existing network, but rather on what a state-of-the-art system would now cost to 
construct.  This hypothetical network is assumed to operate at sufficient scale (number of 
customers served) and scope (number of products offered) such that unit costs are 
minimized.  The entrant, even if inefficient at operating a telecommunications network, 
may thus avail itself of economies of scale and scope by picking and choosing among the 
elements, or buying the entire package as a UNE-P. 
 
The details of TELRIC pricing are complicated in that a large number of 
individual costs must be estimated for specific network configurations.  But the basic idea 
behind the pricing model is straightforward, and can be summarized as follows.  Suppose, 
for example, that at time 0, a UNE (used in a specific network configuration) has a useful 
lifetime T and a current purchase cost (net of expected salvage value) k0, and that the 
ILEC weighted-average cost of capital (WACC) is ρ.  The ILEC would then be 
“reimbursed” for its capital cost by receiving an annuity payment each year based on this 














                                                 
21 Federal Communications Commission, Report and Order and Order on Remand and Further Notice of 
Proposed Rulemaking, In the Matter of Review of the Section 251 Unbundling Obligations of Incumbent 
Local Exchange Carriers, CC Docket No. 01-338; Implementation of the Local Competition Provisions of 
the Telecommunications Act of 1996, CC Docket No. 96-98; Deployment of Wireline Services Offering 
Advanced Telecommunications Capability, CC Docket No. 98-147, paragraph 670. 
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The total TELRIC price would also include payment for one-time set-up costs and direct 
and indirect ongoing costs.  Thus the total annual rental price would be: 
 
Pt = A + DNRCt + DRCt + CRCt, 
 
where  DNRC = direct non-recurring costs (e.g., one-time set-up charges); 
  DRC = direct recurring costs (e.g., operating expenses tied to the element); 
  CRC = common recurring costs (e.g., administrative overhead).   
 
Of course, the CLEC could rent the UNE for only one or two months rather than a year, 
and the payment would be prorated accordingly. 
 
As a simple example, suppose that an ILEC purchases a switch for $10,000 which 
will serve 100 lines, so that k0 is $100 per line.  Suppose it has a useful life of five years, 
i.e., T = 5, and no salvage value.  Finally, assume that the firm’s cost of capital, ρ, is ten 
percent, that it will cost $500 per year to operate the switch, i.e., DRCt = $5 per line, and 
that DNRCt and CRCt are zero.  Then, from the formula above, the amortized value of the 
$10,000 investment is $2,637.98 per year, or $26.38 per line.  With direct recurring costs 
of $5, zero salvage value, zero direct non-recurring costs, and zero common recurring 
costs, the TELRIC price would be $31.38 per line per year.  
 
 
D. An Entrant’s Investment Choices – Wait, Lease, or Build 
 
  A CLEC that is deciding whether to compete with an ILEC can enter the market 
and provide service in a number of ways, and its decisions will be affected by the 
regulatory approach embodied in TELRIC pricing of UNEs.  In particular, the access 
rights conveyed to entrants include a range of options and liabilities that the CLEC 
considers as part of a two-stage entry strategy.  
 
   S T A G E   1       STAGE  2   
   
            
     Enter       Rent  Existing  Facilities    
               
       No Entry          Build New Facilities   
 
  A potential CLEC first considers whether it should become an actual competitor.  
If it does enter the market, it selects whether to do so by renting existing network 
facilities, or building its own.  (For simplicity, I omit the third path whereon some 
elements are rented from the ILEC and some are supplied by the CLEC.)  The availability 
of UNEs at TELRIC prices clearly impacts both levels of decision making.  Without 
mandatory network sharing, a firm would confront the same basic choices (enter/no 
entry, rent/build), but would have to reach a network sharing agreement with an existing 
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network were it to rent facilities.
22  The purpose of unbundling regulation is to lower the 
effective wholesale price at which such facilities can be accessed.   
 
  Focusing solely on direct effects, this regulatory regime heightens incentives for 
CLECs to enter:  Lower input prices increase profits, all else equal.  Also, in the second 
stage, lower rents raise the relative cost of owning rather than leasing.  Thus the 
availability of UNEs at TELRIC prices should (1) induce CLEC entry; and (2) bias 
CLEC entry toward renting and away from network building (the substitution effect). 
 
  But there are also important indirect effects.  Entry conditions that discourage 
CLECs from building networks creates liabilities for all firms — incumbents and new 
entrants.  These firms anticipate that favorable market conditions (e.g., stronger consumer 
demand than previously expected) will rapidly trigger entry by sharing, which 
discourages irreversible investment.  Because they will compete in the future with 
CLECs renting ILEC facilities at favorable prices, potential entrants will today anticipate 
lower future returns than under an alternative regulatory regime.  Thus an indirect effect 
of UNEs at TELRIC prices is that such rules (3) lower irreversible CLEC investment due 
to anticipated entry via network sharing. 
 
  There are other indirect incentive effects, including those flowing from 
uncertainty introduced by politicization of network access rate-setting.  The principle 
argument for UNEs at TELRIC rates is that entry via renting is highly complementary 
with future entry by network building, even though the latter may occur much later.  
Complexities arise that rely on empirical evaluation to sort out.  The point here, however, 
is that mandatory unbundling creates a tension between the use of capital and the creation 
of capital.  This is true even ignoring incumbent network owners.    
 
 
III. TELRIC Pricing and “Forward-Looking” Costs 
 
  An important area of confusion about TELRIC pricing is its use of “forward-
looking” costs. The FCC argues that because sunk costs should be ignored by a firm 
when it makes current output, pricing, or investment decisions, sunk costs should 
likewise be ignored in the wholesale pricing rule imposed by regulators on network 
owners.  The returns to sunk capital, however, are highly relevant to forward-looking 
investors, and the income streams from sunk cost investments are the only reason that 
they are made in the first place.
23 
                                                 
 
22 This assumes the existence of the interconnection obligations specified in the Telecom Act. 
 
23 Alfred Kahn summarized the problem eloquently: “I suppose that I should be flattered by the fact that the 
Federal Communications Commission cited my Economics of Regulation... six or seven times… I never 
dreamed, however, in proclaiming that efficient prices should be based on incremental costs, that 
policymakers would then proceed to ignore the actual incremental costs of the incumbent suppliers and 
instead adopt as the basis for policy the incremental costs of a hypothetical, most efficient new entrant…” 
(Alfred Kahn, Whom the Gods Would Destroy, or How Not to Deregulate, AEI-Brookings Joint Center for 
Policy Studies, Washington, DC, 2001, pp. 3-4; emphasis in original.) 
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A.  A Sunk Cost Fallacy 
 
  The FCC has advanced the idea that wholesale rates should be set on the basis of 
forward-looking costs, with historical costs disregarded, the intent being to prevent the 
recovery of costs that were either imprudent or reflective of inefficient “old technology.”  
The FCC argues that with new and improved systems available, competitors should be 
given access to facilities at their current cost, as if the best systems were deployed.  To 
allow ILECs to recover embedded costs would, as the Supreme Court has put it, promote 
“some degree of long-run inefficiency.”
24  The idea seems to be that just as decision 
makers in the marketplace disregard sunk costs, so should regulatory price setters.
25 
 
  This is incorrect.  It ignores the basic fact that sunk costs do matter in decision-
making when those costs have yet to be sunk.  The TELRIC pricing rule, by denying 
investors recovery today of costs previously sunk, deters current investment.  The lack of 
compensation for investments already made cannot deter those past decisions which, by 
definition, are bygones.  But when investors know that new capital outlays will not be 
recouped, their behavior changes.  Investors rationally commit less new capital in 
anticipation of inadequate returns.  The argument that forward-looking costs are the only 
relevant considerations in an efficient pricing rule confuses the “sunk cost fallacy;” an 
efficient level of investment requires that the returns to that investment are anticipated to 
include a payback of sunk costs. 
 
  From a public policy perspective sunk costs are hardly irrelevant.  If a policy 
deprives owners of returns from capital already sunk, this alters the perspective of 
forward-looking investors, who observe a policy change that influences the levels of risk 
and reward they anticipate in future periods.  Investors’ estimates of both profits and risk 
shift in response. 
 
  In short, a rule depriving investors of the ability to recoup sunk costs becomes 
part of the forward-looking analysis for capital not yet sunk.   Of course, if there is no 
concern about creating incentives for new investment, it is reasonable to argue that 
efficient pricing should be entirely “forward-looking” and sunk costs should indeed be 
ignored.  But creating incentives for new investment is crucial.  Capital depreciates and 
must be maintained or replaced, and efficient new technologies require new investment.  
The investment needed to adopt new technologies is especially important in local 
telecommunications networks.  If firms considering investing in more modern systems 
face the constraint that TELRIC pricing will not allow them to recover sunk costs, they 
simply will not have the incentive to make the investments needed to update and expand 
telecom networks. 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
 
24 Verizon v. U.S., 535 U.S. 467 (2002), p. 45.    
 
25 The Supreme Court writes: “’Sunk costs’ are unrecoverable past costs; practically every other sort of 
economic ‘cost’ is forward looking, or can be either historical or forward looking.”  Ibid., p. 35. 
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  Consider a firm investing in telephone network infrastructure today.   The firm 
could be an incumbent local exchange carrier or a competitive local exchange carrier that 
will compete with an ILEC regulated under TELRIC rules.  To commit to an irreversible 
investment means risking capital that will be rented in future periods at prices that do not 
repay today’s costs.  (In the CLEC case, rival infrastructure will be rented at such rates, 
making pricing above this level uncompetitive.)  TELRIC rates for UNEs are anticipated 
to decline over time due to improvements in technology.  In the short time frame 
available for analysis of this regulatory structure, UNE rental rates (set by individual 
states) have tended to decline, as seen in Table 1.  Between July and December of 2002, 
25 states reduced their UNE rates.
26  National average UNE-P charges are estimated to 





TABLE 1.  DECLINE IN UNE-P PRICES (NATIONAL AVERAGES) 
 
Time Period  Decline in 
UNE-P Rate 




July to December, 2002  7.8%
  15% Gregg  2003 
May to August, 2002  10%
  34% Kovacs  2002 
August to October, 2002  5% 
  18% Kovacs  2002 
Sources: Billy Jack Gregg, “A Survey of Unbundled Network Element Prices in the United States,” 
(Updated January 1, 2003); Anna Maria Kovacs, Kristin Burns and Gregory Vitale, “The Status of 271 and 
UNE-Platform in the Regional Bells’ Territories,” Commercial Capital Markets Regulatory Update, 
November 8, 2002. 
 
  From the point of view of forward-looking investors in 2004, this pattern of 
regulated wholesale rates lowers expected returns from investments in network 
infrastructure.  The treatment of sunk costs under the regulatory pricing rule is hardly 
irrelevant to investors choosing between alternative projects today. 
 
B.  Investment When Costs Decline Over Time 
 
  One might ask why, if improved technologies are available and equipment costs 
have fallen, should CLECs lease equipment from ILECs at rates based on the older-
technology and/or higher-cost equipment that the ILEC actually purchased?  Indeed, as 
explained above, the FCC believes that with new and improved systems available, 
competitors should be given access to facilities at their current cost, as if the best systems 
had been deployed by the ILEC now, and not at some point in the past.  The FCC’s view 
is that to allow the ILEC to recover its actual costs would be inefficient:  Pricing should 
simulate a competitive market, and in a competitive market, equipment that is leased 
                                                 
 
26 Billy Jack Gregg, “A Survey of Unbundled Network Element Prices in the United States,” (Updated 
January 1, 2003). 
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should be valued at current incremental cost.
27  For example, if an ILEC bought a switch 
two years ago for $1 million but that switch could by purchased today for $800,000, why 
shouldn’t a CLEC be able to lease the switch based on the current $800,000 cost?  In a 
competitive market, wouldn’t entry occur based on the $800,000 cost? 
 
  It is important to understand how and why this is misleading when applied to 
telecom networks.  The textbook model of perfect competition adopted by the FCC 
assumes that there is free entry and exit, with no sunk costs.  In the telecom industry, 
however, there are very large sunk costs.  (In fact, the existence of sunk costs is why 
TELRIC pricing originated in the first place.)  Thus the correct economic model is one in 
which there is free entry, but entry involves a sunk cost.   
 
  Now, consider a market in which there is free entry but at a sunk cost.  Suppose, 
for example, that to enter a firm must buy a machine, which at time t costs an amount kt.  
Furthermore, suppose that this cost has been falling over time, and is expected to 
continue to fall.  For simplicity, we will also assume that marginal operating cost is zero, 
i.e., the machine cost is the only cost of being in business.  The market price at which 
firms sell their output is Pt, and it depends on how many firms are operating (or more 
accurately, total industry capacity).  Because the cost of a machine is falling over time, 
firms in the industry, as well as those contemplating entry, expect that the market price at 
which they can sell their output will fall over time.  How, then, will firms make the 
decision whether or not to enter the industry? 
 
  Each firm invests in machines up to the point that the net present value (NPV) of 
a machine is just positive.  But the NPV must account for the fact that the output price 
will fall over time as other firms enter at a lower machine cost.  Thus the anticipated 
profit from owning and using the machine in the first year must be higher than it would 
be were the cost of a machine expected to remain constant.  In this way, a firm that buys 
a machine today can expect to recoup its “losses” from output price declines in the future.  
If someone were to look at this industry, he or she might think that it was not competitive 
because the output price today exceeded the amortized price of capital.  But of course this 
just reflects the fact that firms require a positive NPV to invest, and thus must be 
compensated now for expected entry and price declines in the future.  Thus the industry is 
indeed competitive in the sense that any firm can enter and compete by buying machines.  
It is this model of competition that UNE pricing should try to simulate. 
 
  In the telecom world, CLECs do not have to buy “machines” in order to enter and 
compete with an ILEC – they can simply lease the ILEC’s “machine.”  At issue is what 
the lease fee (i.e., the TELRIC price) should be in order to motivate the ILEC (and 
efficient CLECs) to make further capital investments in the expectation of earning a 
                                                 
27 This view has been put forward by Baumol, Ordover, and Willig (Affidavit of William J. Baumol, Janusz 
A. Ordover, and Robert D. Willig, In the Matter of Implementation of the Local Competition Provisions of 
the Telecommunications Act of 1996, CC Docket No. 96-98, Appendix C of AT&T Comments, May 16, 
1996) and Hubbard, Lehr, Ordover and Willig (Affidavit of R. Glenn Hubbard, William H. Lehr, Janusz A. 
Ordover, and Robert D. Willig on Behalf of AT&T Corp., In the Matter of Implementation of the Local 
Competition Provisions of the Telecommunications Act of 1996, CC Docket No. 96-98, Exhibit B, June 10, 
1999) among others. 
  14 
competitive return.  There are two possibilities:  (1) Set the TELRIC price based on the 
current capital cost ($800,000 in our example of an ILEC buying a switch), but allow the 
ILEC to charge a price for service that is high enough so that it can still expect a positive 
NPV on its investment.  (2) Set the TELRIC price based on the historical capital cost 
($1,000,000 in our example) that the ILEC actually paid, and do not allow a service price 
“premium.”   
 
  In practice, retail price regulation prevents the ILEC from setting a high enough 
price on its service to earn a “premium” on its current investment.  Thus if the ILEC 
knows that in the future it will be forced to lease its capital at a TELRIC price based on 
what will then be a lower capital cost, it will calculate that its NPV on the investment is 
negative, and it will not invest.  An NPV of zero (which just gives the ILEC the incentive 
to invest) requires a TELRIC price based on the higher cost that the ILEC actually paid 
for its equipment.  Given the retail price regulation typically faced by an ILEC, this is the 
way that regulators can simulate the kind of competitive market that is relevant here. 
 
  Note that the discussion above makes no mention of uncertainty over future 
market conditions.  Indeed, uncertainty was assumed away so that we could focus on the 
problem of expected declines in the cost of equipment.  However, uncertainty over future 
market conditions, and the asymmetric burden of risk that is inherent in TELRIC pricing, 
is an additional deterrent to investment.  This is discussed in the next section.  But first, I 
show analytically why the UNE price should be based on the historical cost paid by the 
incumbent. 
 
C.  Free Entry with Declining Costs 
 
  Suppose that firms can freely enter an industry simply by buying a machine, and 
that they can enter either today (t = 0) or at a future time T.  The cost of the machine is 
the only cost of production, and each machine gives the firm a capacity of one unit of 
output per period.  Suppose that today the cost of the machine is k0, but at time T the cost 
will be kT < k0.  If today firms knew that there would be no additional entry at time T, 
they would purchase machines up to the point that the NPV of the investment were zero.  
Thus the market price would be , where r is the competitive cost of capital (the 
discount rate), and the superscript N denotes no further entry at T.  
0
N Pr k = 0
d t
 
  If instead there will be additional entry at T, firms entering today must take this 
into account.  They know that at time T entry will occur up to the point that the NPV of 
purchasing a machine that costs kT is just zero, so that the price at time T will fall to PT = 
rkT.  Thus the NPV of purchasing a machine today is: 
 







kP e d t r k e
∞
−− =− + + ∫∫
 
Firms will invest today up to the point that this NPV is just zero, which implies that the 
price today (and up until time T) will be: 


















where the superscript E denotes that there will be further entry at time T.  
 
  What is the difference between the initial price when there is further entry and the 
price when there is not?  The difference is given by: 
 













Because kT < k0, the price when there is entry must be higher than when there is no entry.   
 
Suppose, however, that the initial price is constrained (via retail price regulation) 
to be at the lower “no entry” level.  At time T, entrants come in, but rather than buy their 
own machines, they simply lease the machines owned by the incumbents.  If they leased 
those machines at the rental rate rk0, i.e., based on the historical cost that the incumbents 
paid for the machines, the incumbents would still have an ex post NPV of zero, so that 
the conditions of a competitive market would prevail.  But what if instead the entrants 
can lease the machines at the lower rental rate rkT, i.e., based on the lower “forward-
looking” cost of machines?  In that case the incumbents would have an ex post NPV that 
is negative.  In other words, if the incumbents knew in advance that they would have to 
rent their machines at this lower rate, they would not want to invest in the first place, 
because investing would yield a below-competitive return on their capital. 
 
This is exactly the problem with the “forward-looking” aspect of TELRIC pricing.  
When the cost of network equipment has been falling and is expected to keep falling, 
ILECs will have no incentive to make ongoing investments in their networks.  The same 
disincentives apply to CLECs that might otherwise build their own capital. 
 
 
IV. Overview of Option Value   
 
The purpose of this section is to provide a brief overview of the concept of option 
value, the opportunity cost of making a sunk cost (i.e., irreversible) investment, and the 
application of these ideas to the Telecom Act and TELRIC pricing.  (For a detailed 
treatment of option value and irreversible investment, see A. Dixit and R. Pindyck, 
Investment Under Uncertainty, Princeton University Press.) 
 
A.  The Option to Invest 
 
  TELRIC pricing is based on a simple investment rule that has been taught widely 
in business schools, and is the basis for much of neoclassical investment theory in 
economics:  the Net Present Value (NPV) rule.  This rule says that a firm should invest in 
a project if the NPV of the project is positive, i.e., if  
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where  I0,  I1, … are investment outlays, π1, … are net cash flows arising from the 
investment, and ρ is the discount rate, usually the WACC.  If the investment is 
completely reversible, or there is no uncertainty over the future cash flows, or this 
investment is a now-or-never proposition (i.e., there is no possibility of delaying the 
investment), then this rule is correct.  However, if the investment is fully or partly 
irreversible, there is uncertainty over the cash flows, and the investment could be 
delayed, the rule is wrong.  In particular, the use of this rule does not maximize the firm’s 
value, i.e., the firm would do better using a different rule. 
 
  Why is this NPV rule incorrect?  Because it makes the wrong comparison – it 
compares investing today with never investing.  The correct comparison is investing 
today versus waiting, and perhaps (depending on how market conditions turn out) 
investing at some unspecified time in the future.  Put differently, a firm with an 
opportunity to invest is holding an “option” analogous to a financial call option – it has 
the right but not the obligation to buy an asset at some future time of its choosing.  When 
a firm makes an irreversible investment expenditure, it exercises its option to invest.  It 
gives up the possibility of waiting for new information to arrive that might affect the 
desirability or timing of the expenditure; it cannot disinvest should market conditions 
change adversely.  This lost option value is an opportunity cost that must be included as 
part of the total cost of the investment.  As a result, the NPV rule “Invest when the value 
of a unit of capital is at least as large as its purchase and installation cost” must be 
modified.  The value of the unit must exceed the purchase and installation cost, by an 
amount equal to the value of keeping the investment option alive.   
 
 
B.  A Simple Example 
 
  A simple example may help to clarify these ideas.
28  Suppose a firm is 
considering a network investment that will cost $8,000, and will immediately generate 
annual cash flows that will continue forever.  This year, the cash flow will be $1,000, but 
next year, depending on market conditions, it will either increase to $1,500 or decrease to 
$500, with equal probability.  For simplicity, let us assume that the cash flow will then 
stay at that level ($1,500 or $500) for all future years. 
 
  What is the NPV of this investment, assuming we invest immediately?  Since the 
expected value of the cash flow from next year on is $1,000, the NPV is: 
 
                                                 
28 This is a modified version of an example in Chapter 2 of Avinash K. Dixit and Robert S. Pindyck, 
Investment Under Uncertainty, (Princeton: Princeton University Press; 1994). 
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where ρt is the discount rate, i.e., the cost of capital.  Assuming that the value of this 
discount rate is 10 percent, the NPV is equal to –8000 + 11,000 = $3000.  The NPV is 
positive, so investment seems warranted.  But is it? 
 
  Now suppose we wait a year, and then invest only if the annual cash flow goes up 
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By waiting a year before deciding whether to invest, the NPV is $3864, whereas it is only 
$3000 if we invest today.  Clearly it is better to wait rather than invest now – even though 
the NPV of investing now is positive.  The reason is simple:  By waiting, we avoid the 
consequences of an unfavorable outcome.  Had we invested today and had the cash flow 
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In other words, we would find ourselves losing money.  If we wait, on the other hand, we 
would simply not invest if the cash flow fell to $500.   
 
What is the value of having the ability to wait, rather than facing a now-or-never 
decision?  It is just the difference in the two NPVs that we calculated above, i.e., $3864 – 
$3000 = $864.  This is the value of the “flexibility option.”  In other words, we should be 
willing to pay up to $864 more for an investment opportunity that is flexible than one that 
only allows us to invest now. 
 
Given that the NPV of investing today is positive, what are we missing?  The 
problem is that this NPV does not properly account for the full cost of investing today – it 
only accounts for the direct expenditure of $8000.  It ignores the opportunity cost of 
“killing” the firm’s option to wait for more information.  That opportunity cost is just 
equal to the value of the option when it is optimally exercised, i.e., when we wait rather 
than invest immediately.  That value is the NPV today when we wait, i.e., it is $3864.  
Thus the true NPV of investing today is $3000 – $3864 = –$864.  Hence the NPV of 
investing today, when properly calculated so as to include opportunity costs, is negative. 
 
This example is a simple one, and thus in some ways unrealistic.  Perhaps most 
important, we assume in the example that all of the uncertainty gets resolved in one year, 
i.e., next year the annual cash flow will either increase or decrease, but then it will no 
longer change from this high or low value.  In reality, there is always uncertainty over 
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future cash flows.
29  Market conditions are constantly evolving, so that the cash flows 
from a capital investment will likewise constantly evolve.  In such a situation, one must 
solve an option pricing problem to determine the value of the firm’s option to invest and 
its optimal investment decision.  Fortunately, methods developed in finance can be 
brought to bear, so that solving this problem is not all that difficult.  But for the time 
being we will stick with our extremely simple two-period example. 
 
 
C.  Application to TELRIC 
 
This simple example illustrates a major problem with TELRIC pricing.  Suppose 
that an ILEC has just made the $8000 investment in network equipment described above.  
Of course, next year, if the cash flow from the investment falls to $500 per year, the 
ILEC will regret having made the investment rather than waiting (and indeed, as we saw, 
waiting is optimal), but for purposes of this example we will assume that the ILEC 
invested nonetheless.  Now a CLEC arrives and decides to rent this equipment.  How 
much will the CLEC be charged under TELRIC? 
 
In order to focus on option value and opportunity cost, let us assume that there is 
no relevant technological change, so that the cost of the network equipment stays at 
$8000.  (Recall that another problem with TELRIC is that it is based on forward-looking 
cost, rather than the cost actually incurred by the ILEC, so that when cost is falling over 
time, the ILEC will recover less than what it paid to create the infrastructure in question.)  
Suppose the ILEC’s WACC is 10 percent.  Because (by assumption) the equipment lasts 
forever, it would be amortized as a perpetuity, and the CLEC would be charged 
(.1)(8000) = $800 per year.   
 
The problem, of course, is that the $8000 base from which the $800 annual rental 
charge is calculated does not fully reflect the ILEC’s total cost of its investment.  As we 
saw above, the ILEC also incurred a $3864 opportunity cost by investing now and killing 
its option to wait for additional information.  This opportunity cost reflects the fact that if 
market conditions next year turn out to be adverse (i.e., the cash flow falls to $500), the 
ILEC will lose money on its investment.  But won’t the CLEC also lose money if the 
cash flow falls next year?  No – the CLEC is free to walk away and stop renting the 
equipment.  The CLEC will only continue to rent the equipment if the cash flow increases 
to $1500.  Thus the CLEC has a win-win situation.  The ILEC, on the other hand, will be 
left with unprofitable capital should market conditions become adverse. 
 
How much should the CLEC be charged to properly account for the opportunity 
cost that has been “paid” by the ILEC?  The correct capital cost is not $8000, but rather 
$8000 + $3864 = $11,864.  Thus the CLEC should pay an annual rental charge of 
(0.1)(11,864) = $1,186.  Only then would the ILEC be fully compensated for its total cost 
                                                 
29 In this example, all of the uncertainty is resolved in one year, so if the CLEC enters in year 2 because the 
cash flow has risen to $1500 it will be more profitable for the CLEC to build its own facilities rather than 
lease the ILEC’s capital.  If uncertainty about cash flows continued, then the CLEC would find leasing the 
ILEC’s capital more profitable. 
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of capital investment.  Because it is being undercompensated, the ILEC will be 
discouraged from undertaking further investments. 
  
This example, of course, is highly stylized and oversimplified, with numbers 
made up for convenience.  An important question is how large in practice is the 
opportunity cost incurred by an ILEC when it invests in network infrastructure, i.e., by 
how large a percentage does TELRIC undercompensate ILECs?  To answer that question 
requires a more detailed empirical analysis. 
 
 
V. TELRIC Pricing: Disincentives Related to Option Value 
  
The previous section discussed the basic concept of option value and explained 
why it is missing from TELRIC pricing.  In this section, a somewhat more detailed 
example is presented to further elucidate the sources of option value in a 
telecommunications network, and to show how it is missing from TELRIC.  The example 
is based on a hypothetical switch that is installed by an ILEC, but may be utilized by a 
CLEC.  I begin by discussing the TELRIC price for this capital investment, and then go 
on to calculate the option value associated with the ILEC’s investment.  CLEC entry is 
then discussed, and it is shown how TELRIC under compensates the ILEC by failing to 
capture this option value.  Finally, I show how the TELRIC price can be corrected to 
properly account for this option value.  To keep this example simple, I ignore other 
important problems of unbundling at TELRIC prices, such as declining capital costs. 
  
A.  The Capital Investment and the TELRIC Price 
 
  Consider an ILEC that will install a new switch, intended to serve any growth in 
demand above the current baseline level.  The switch can serve 40,000 lines, costs 
$400,000, and has a useful life of 4 years.  The ILEC knows that demand will grow by 
20,000 lines next year (year 1), and will stay at that higher level in year 2.  There is 
uncertainty, however, about what will happen in year 3.  In that year, with equal 
probability, demand will either grow by 20,000 lines (so that it is 40,000 lines above the 
original baseline level), or it will fall by 20,000 lines (bringing it back to the baseline 
level).  It will then remain at this level in year 4.  If the CLEC enters the market, it will be 
able to serve the 20,000-line growth in demand (if it occurs) in years 3 and 4.  The ILEC 
also faces a fixed cost, FC, of $45,600 per year.  Finally, revenue per line (RPL) from the 
services of the switch is assumed to be $7.50 per year. 
 
To calculate the TELRIC price for this switch, assume that the discount rate is 10 
percent per year, and that the only cost associated with the switch is its $400,000 
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The switch has a capacity of 40,000 lines, but the expected usage of the switch is 
only 20,000 lines per year.  Therefore the per-line TELRIC price for the switch is 
.  
4 /20,000 $6.3094
TELRIC y PA ==
 
B.  The ILEC’s NPV 
 
  Before introducing unbundling and TELRIC pricing, it will be useful to calculate 
the NPV of the ILEC’s investment, assuming that there is no later entry by a CLEC.  
Given that there is uncertainty over whether demand will increase or decrease in year 3, 
the ILEC would probably prefer to wait until that uncertainty is resolved before deciding 
whether to invest.  The ILEC is not able to do so, however, because of its duty to serve all 
customers imposed on it by regulators combined with the fact that it must purchase a 4 
year switch.  Regulators also set the retail price (in this case the revenue per line, RPL) so 
that the ILEC does not earn any economic profits on its investment.
30  In this case, the 
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The first term on the right-hand side of this equation is the discounted capital cost of the 
switch.  The second term is the present value of the revenue (net of the fixed cost) from 
the known 20,000 lines of additional demand in years 1 and 2.  The third term is the 
present value of the net revenue from the 40,000 lines of additional demand (the 20,000 
from year 2 plus a growth of another 20,000) in years 3 and 4, and is multiplied by 0.5 
because there is only a 0.5 probability that demand will indeed grow in year 3 (and a 0.5 
probability that demand will fall back to its baseline level so that there is no revenue from 
the switch in years 3 and 4). 
 
The option value associated with the uncertainty over the growth in demand in 
years 3 and 4 can be found by recalculating this NPV, but this time giving the ILEC the 
option of buying two 2-year switches instead of one 4-year switch.  I will assume that the 
purchase price of a 2-year switch is $219,005 so that it has the same annualized capital 
cost and TELRIC price as the 4-year switch.
31  In this case, the ILEC buys a 2-year 
switch to serve the additional demand of 20,000 lines in years 1 and 2, but it buys another 
2-year switch in year 3 only if demand increases in that year, which has probability 0.5 of 
occurring.  Because of this flexibility, the ILEC’s NPV will now be higher: 
 
                                                 
30 It is important to be clear about the meaning of zero economic profits.  This means that the firm earns an 
expected risk-adjusted competitive return on its investment.  That expected competitive return is the firm’s 
opportunity cost of investing – including it as a cost reduces the firm’s profit to zero. 
 
31 Based on the formula for At above, the annual capital cost of the 2-year switch is $126,188, as with the 4-
year switch. 




219,005 *20,000 219,005 *40,000
0.5* $82,270.
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The increase in the NPV – in this case $82,270 – is the option value that is lost to the 
ILEC by being required to commit to the market for 4 years. 
 
C.  ILEC Investment with CLEC Entry 
 
  What happens when unbundling at TELRIC prices is imposed on the existing 
regulatory regime?  To address this question, assume as before that the ILEC must invest 
in a 4-year switch and stand ready to serve all customers, but that now a CLEC can enter 
and serve some of those customers, if it is profitable for the CLEC to do so.  Specifically, 
we will assume that the CLEC is able to serve the 20,000-line growth in demand in years 
3 and 4, should that growth materialize.  As will be clear from this example, the option 
value of being able to enter and serve this growth in demand is transferred from the ILEC 
to the CLEC. 
 
  Begin with the NPV for the ILEC.  In this case, the ILEC spends $400,000 on a 4-
year switch in year 1, and uses that switch to serve 20,000 customers in years 1 and 2.  If 
demand falls in year 3 back to its baseline level, the switch then goes unutilized in years 3 
and 4.  If demand increases by another 20,000 lines, those lines are served by the CLEC, 
which pays the ILEC the TELRIC price calculated above, and the ILEC continues to 





400,000 *20,000 *20,000 *20,000
0.5* $17,077
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Note that the ILEC pays for a four-year switch and gets the revenues from the 20,000 
customers in years 1 and 2, but if demand falls in year 3, the ILEC gets no additional 
revenue from the switch.  If demand grows in year 3, the ILEC receives revenue from the 
customers it continues to have in years 3 and 4 and receives payments from the CLEC for 
the growth in customers that the CLEC serves.  The CLEC’s NPV is the expected 
discounted value of the CLEC’s revenues minus its TELRIC payments to the ILEC for 

















 ∑  
 
Observe that the CLEC’s expected gain is precisely the ILEC’s expected loss, i.e., 
$17,077.  This transfer from the ILEC to the CLEC results in the ILEC earning less than 
a competitive return on its investment – a situation that cannot be sustained if we expect 
the ILEC to willingly invest in the future. 
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D.  TELRIC Corrected for Option Value 
 
The last step in this example is to show how the TELRIC price can be corrected for the 
ILEC’s lost option value. To do this, we find the TELRIC price that makes the ILEC’s 
NPV when there is CLEC entry just equal to zero (instead of the -$17,077 calculated 





() * 2 0 , 0 0 0 400,000 *20,000 *20,000
0.5* 0.
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The TELRIC price that satisfies this equation is  . Using this corrected 
TELRIC price, the payments from the CLEC compensate the ILEC for the option value 




















 ∑ . 
 
With this corrected TELRIC price, both the ILEC and the CLEC are now earning 
a competitive return.  In other words, with this correction, the regulatory regime now 
comes closer to simulating a competitive market, which is presumably the goal of the 





  It has been argued that the TELRIC pricing methodology is efficient despite the 
problems discussed in this paper.  Theories supporting non-remuneration of irreversible 
investments or ignoring real option values can be constructed, but they rely on special 
circumstances unrelated to the local telecommunications marketplace.  Among these are 
the arguments that investment disincentives do not matter because local phone networks 
are already built, that option values are incorporated into the cost of capital used by 
regulators to establish TELRIC prices, and that investments in local exchange facilities 
are not irreversible or risky.  These arguments are discussed below. 
 
A.  The Network Is Already There 
 
If communications networks were already built and no new investment were 
needed to maintain or improve them, the disincentives resulting from policies that under-
compensate investors might not be of much importance.  Owners of existing facilities 
would suffer economic losses, but consumers would be largely unaffected, because 
earlier investments in the existing networks cannot be “undone.”  
 
The reality of local telecommunications systems, however, is that ongoing 
investments are necessary just to maintain a given quality of service.  Without ongoing 
capital flows, network functionality will depreciate.   From 1990 to 1995, approximately 
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$20 billion in annual capital expenditures was used just to maintain existing Bell (ILEC) 
networks.  (See Figure 1.)  With demand for data services (including DSL) beginning to 
drive new capital expenditures starting around 1996, annual investment grew strongly 
through 2000.  By 2002, real ILEC investment had fallen to about where it was in 1990.  
Clearly substantial expenditures are needed simply to maintain the existing infrastructure, 
and further investments are necessary to upgrade systems or to deploy new technologies. 
 


























Sources: JP Morgan, as reported in the Association for Local Telecommunications Services, "The State of Local Competition  
2003," April 2003, p. 10.
Note: This data excludes expenditures on wireless facilities.
 
 
Financial analysts have noted that the replacement level for ILEC capital 
investment is between fifteen and twenty percent of revenues.
32  Through 2002, 
investment levels were in the middle of this range, and were projected to sink to or below 
the bottom end in 2003.
33  If new capital flows are constrained, investors will divert 





                                                 
32 “We think that RBOCs cannot let these ratios decline too much further before they will encounter 
service-affecting conditions in their networks.  We consider ‘maintenance’ spending levels with 
capex/revenues in the 15-20% range.”  Skyline Marketing Group, “CapEx Report
TM: 2002,” (June 2003), 
http://www.skylinemarketing.com.  
 
33 Precursor Group, “’Telecom Disconnect’: Quality of Bell Free Cash Flow Worsening,” July 21, 2003. 
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B. Option Value is Already Incorporated in the Cost of Capital 
 
Some have claimed that the option value discussed earlier is already accounted for 
in the cost of capital.
34  In other words, they argue that an input to the calculation of the 
TELRIC price is the cost of capital, and the cost of capital includes a “premium” that 
covers the option value inherent in an irreversible investment.  This is not true. 
 
The cost of capital that is typically used in the TELRIC price is the ILEC’s or a 
hypothetical firm’s weighted average cost of capital (WACC), which is simply an 
average of its expected return on equity (which can be computed using the Capital Asset 
Pricing Model, or CAPM) and its cost of debt, with the weights being the relative shares 
of equity and debt.  This WACC does not incorporate any adjustment for option value.  
To understand why, note that the WACC is simply the firm’s opportunity cost of capital.  
However, it is not the threshold expected return (or hurdle rate) needed to justify an 
investment.  It would be the threshold expected return (or hurdle rate) if the investment in 
question was reversible, or if the firm had no option to delay investing and thereby wait 
for more information about market conditions.  If, on the other hand, the investment in 
question is irreversible (as is usually the case in the telecom industry), the hurdle rate 
must exceed this opportunity cost of capital.   
 
Put differently, if the hurdle rate for an investment is the firm’s opportunity cost 
of capital, then the firm is investing when the NPV of the project is just above zero.  But 
as explained in Section IV of this paper, when the investment is irreversible the NPV 
must be significantly greater than zero, because the firm is “killing” its option to invest 
by exercising that option.  Thus the firm is incurring an opportunity cost that is missing 
from the standard NPV calculation.  (If the NPV were properly calculated to include this 
opportunity cost, then the standard NPV rule would apply.)  Because of this opportunity 
cost, an investment is justified only when the standard NPV is significantly greater than 
zero, so the hurdle rate must be significantly greater than the firm’s overall opportunity 
cost of capital.  Equivalently, the firm’s opportunity cost of actually investing in new 
plant or equipment will exceed its overall opportunity cost of capital, i.e., its WACC. 
 
Many (including economists) are confused by this point.  Another way to think 
about it is to remember that the firm can benefit by waiting for information, and thereby 
avoiding a bad state of the world where an investment yields a negative return.  If the 
firm behaves optimally, it will take this opportunity cost into account.  In a competitive 
market, all firms will take this into account, and on average firms will earn a competitive 
return on capital – namely the competitive WACC.  There is no reward for investing sub-
optimally, e.g., for ignoring this opportunity cost when determining the hurdle rate for a 
project.  The WACC will prevail on average, but for any specific irreversible investment, 
                                                 
 
34 For example, the FCC claims that all risks are included in the cost of capital.  See, Federal 
Communications Commission, Report and Order and Order on Remand and Further Notice of Proposed 
Rulemaking, In the Matter of Review of the Section 251 Unbundling Obligations of Incumbent Local 
Exchange Carriers, CC Docket No. 01-338; Implementation of the Local Competition Provisions of the 
Telecommunications Act of 1996, CC Docket No. 96-98; Deployment of Wireline Services Offering 
Advanced Telecommunications Capability, CC Docket No. 98-147, paragraphs 677-684. 
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the opportunity cost is the WACC plus the cost of exercising the firm’s option to invest.  
Thus the WACC alone does not account for option value. 
 
C.   Most Telecom Investments Are Not Irreversible 
 
  It has also been argued that for the most part, investments in the telecom industry 
are not irreversible, i.e., do not involve sunk costs.  The argument seems to be that much 
of this capital could be sold to other telecom firms, and thus could be “uninvested.”
35  
This claim suggests a lack of understanding of what a sunk cost entails.   
 
First, in many cases recovery through resale is simply not possible.  An example, 
discussed in the beginning of this paper, is the copper or fiber-optic cable that has been 
placed underground; most of the cost is the labor for installing the cable, rather than the 
cable itself, so removing the cable is not economical. 
 
But what about investments in switches or other equipment that could be 
uninstalled and resold?  As explained earlier, the problem is that the equipment is 
industry-specific, and its resale value is tightly connected to economic conditions of the 
industry.  Thus, if conditions turned out to be unfavorable because industry-wide 
conditions were weak, so that the firm wished to “uninvest” by removing and reselling 
the equipment, it would find that other firms would also want to resell such equipment, 
and no firm would want to buy the equipment.  In other words, the economic value of the 
equipment would move up or down along with the economic conditions of the industry, 
making the investment effectively irreversible.   
 
  Many telecommunications network investments are completely or largely 
irreversible because physical recovery is uneconomical (as with the copper or fiber-optic 
cable) and/or the capital itself is industry-specific.   
 
D.  Telecom Investment Returns Are Not Risky 
 
  Option values are important when demand is volatile.  If, however, demand for 
unbundled network elements does not vary much, investment returns will remain fairly 
constant.  Therefore, the premium placed on deferring investments until better 
information is obtained would be low.  In this event, wholesale prices could exclude 
compensation for real options without substantially distorting investment choices.  It has 
been argued that, as an empirical matter, such conditions hold in this market:   
 
A close examination of the issue of uncertainty in the local telecommuni-
cations network reveals that… for most unbundled network elements, 
there is little demand uncertainty…. For example, the ILEC rarely faces 
                                                 
35 Nicholas Economides, “Real Options and the Costs of the Local Telecommunications Network,” in 
James Alleman and Eli Noam, eds., The New Investment Theory of Real Options and Its Implications for 
Telecommunications Economics, (Boston: Kluwer; 1999, Second Printing 2002) pp. 207-13. 
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much uncertainty about local loops that are arguably the most likely to be 
purchased by competitive local exchange carriers (CLECs).
36 
 
  This argument ignores the fact that the values of assets needed to provide local 
phone service have proven highly variable.  This is evident from the high volatility of 
equity returns in the communications sector and the fire sale prices for physical assets 
sold by leading fiber optic manufacturers and switch makers.
37  The sharp decline in 
valuations in the sector is, of course, related to the high level of unpredictability: 
investors would not have sunk so much capital had they possessed better information as 
to future demands and costs. 
 
  Telephone network infrastructure is most economically provided in large, lumpy 
increments, meaning that large, irreversible investments (efficiently) take place upfront.  
Over the ensuing years, demand for services, new and old, uses the capacity created.  The 
degree to which customers end up ordering services and how much they will pay to use 
them is largely indeterminate when the facilities are created.  In the traditionally less 
competitive environment in which POTS (plain old telephone service) was provided by a 
single franchised operator, risks were lower.  But the effects of competition and 
technological change render that world a bygone era.   
 
  Currently, new rivals have the opportunity to take customers away from any 
operator, and – in the case of an ILEC – can use the operator’s own network to serve 
those customers.  Technology has delivered a range of new products to sell customers, 
but forecasting demand for these services is problematic.  It depends not only on how 
many customers will eventually purchase an existing service, but what complementary 
innovations are made available by intermediate suppliers – applications developers, 
equipment makers, content distributors.  The “race for bandwidth” has demonstrated the 
variability in expectations and outcomes.
38 
                                                 
36 Nicholas Economides, “Real Options and the Costs of the Local Telecommunications Network,” in 
James Alleman and Eli Noam, eds., The New Investment Theory of Real Options and Its Implications for 
Telecommunications Economics, (Boston: Kluwer; 1999, Second Printing 2002) pp. 207-13. 
 
37 A recent article reported on the grim economic landscape dotted with telecommunications infrastructure 
builders in Denver, Colorado: “[I]t’s a little disconcerting to drive out Highway 36, through the 
‘convergence corridor’ that made this town a telecom magnet during the Internet boom, and find the 
surviving ranchland studded with half-empty office complexes and mostly vacant parking lots… With 
Qwest now teetering in its downtown high-rise, the shock wave of bankruptcy that’s hit American and 
European Internet carriers is at Denver’s door.  WorldCom, Global Crossing, KPNQwest, Metromedia 
Fiber Network, 360netoworks, XO, Williams Communications – in two and a half years these companies 
have incinerated an astonishing $69 billion in shareholder equity…”  Frank Rose, “Surviving the Fiber-
Optic Fire Sale,” Wired (November 2002), 
http://www.wired.com/wired/ archive/10.11/fiber_optic_pr.html. 
 
38 Many have noted that investment conditions have changed markedly in telecommunications.  Recent 
experience shows that returns from long-term capital investments are highly variable, distinct from the 
pattern in previous generations when the pace of technological change was more measured and competitive 
pressures less intense.  See, for example, the papers presented at the conference at Columbia University 
(May 30, 2002), "The New Telecommunications Industry and Financial Markets: From Utility to 
Volatility," http://www.citi.columbia.edu/conferences/volatility.htm. 





The Telecommunications Act sought to promote competition among networks, 
which could produce benefits both in the delivery of new services and in the more 
efficient delivery of existing services.  But ultimately these benefits will require 
substantial investment in technologies where demand is highly uncertain.  At issue is 
whether the current regulatory structure creates the incentives for such investment.  I 
have argued in this paper that it does not.  By making incumbents’ network investments 
available to competitors at rates that do not fully compensate the incumbents for the 
opportunity costs of their investments, further investment is deterred.  
 
The importance of investment incentives seems to have been better recognized in 
other areas of telecom regulation.  When dealing with new markets, such as broadband, 
unbundling rules tend to be much more limited.  In cable modem service, for example, 
the Federal Communications Commission has repeatedly declined to attach “open 
access” obligations, giving cable system operators an unfettered (and unshared) right to 
vertically integrate into Internet services.  The rationale has not been that market power is 
unimportant, but that encouraging the deployment of new technology takes precedence.  
Consumers are not well served by “protections” that eliminate productive investments, 
and so limit service.  But this applies to existing telephone networks as well.  Indeed, the 
creation of new competitive systems is undermined when CLECs, like ILECs, have little 
incentive to invest. 
 
  The undercompensation of ILECs by TELRIC pricing might suggest that a simple 
transfer has been created.  After all, what is wrong with subsidizing entry if that is what is 
needed to jump-start competition?  The problem is that in the long run there are no gains 
to CLECs from under-pricing UNEs.  That is because the retail-wholesale price margin, a 
form of regulatory arbitrage, is available to all CLECs, and to all which desire to be 
CLECs.  With open entry, a positive present value of the pure resale model cannot be 
sustained.
39  Hence the under-pricing produces investment disincentives without 
offsetting benefits.  This would be a problem in any sector, but is particularly costly when 
it involves such large and important infrastructure.  
 
Striking down barriers which stifle competition is not, when properly executed, 
controversial.  The Telecommunications Act’s pre-emption of state telephone franchising 
laws that sheltered de facto monopolies was straightforward, and hundreds of CLECs 
were soon certified by utility commissions.  Cable telephony and wireless networks are 
today routinely interconnecting with ILEC systems.  They offer close substitutes that are 
replacing ILEC lines and, more importantly, taking substantial shares of local and long 
distance revenues.  In the 14% of U.S. homes where a cable system already offers phone 
                                                                                                                                                 
 
39 Thomas W. Hazlett, “The Irony of Regulated Competition in Telecommunications,” Columbia Science & 
Technology Law Review (forthcoming 2003); http://www.manhattan-institute.org/MI_TWH_ paper.pdf. 
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service, or the much higher percentage where one or more of the six national wireless 
carriers offer coverage, full-blown network rivalry has already emerged. 
 
  Policies that recognize and account for investment incentives are better able to 
insure the continued health of existing networks and the growth of new ones.  Current 
network sharing rules in telecommunications ignore the importance of the irreversibility 
of capital investment.  As discussed in this paper, this reduces the incentive to invest, 
which in the long run is welfare reducing for the consumers of telecom services.  
  29